THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN JAPAN.
III. THE CODES

AS A WORKABLE SYSTEM OF LAW.

If no Western nation had ever transformed its laws, if each
people had developed its indigenous customs into a peculiar
and unique body of law, if no importations from abroad had
ever been employed to systematize or to replace the home
product, the spectacle of the undertaking in which Japan has
been engaged for twenty years might be thought a strange
one. The hostile critic might have free play for his evil
prognostications and might enjoyably spend his sarcasms on
the doctrinaire process of transplanting and regrafting 'foreign
customs. But, as it happens, there exist few nations of the
West, outside the Anglo-American group, which are in a
position to throw the first stone of the sort or have the
inclination to begin such criticism. They are themselves too
vulnerable, nay, they even see no wrong in such a process of
transformation, and they uphold it. As England has never in
eight hundred years felt the foot of an armed invader, so she
has never in that period acknowledged a faith in any laws but
her own. But it is a fact that in almost every other nation of
Europe and America (except the United States) the accepted
law of the land is not wholly an indigenous one, but has been
borrowed from the Roman civil law by a people whose customs required more or less adaptation to it. This statement
is not as yet true of Russia and the Scandinavian nations; but
the fondness for German scientific speculation is growing daily
in those countries and has made especial headway in the great
northern peninsula; and if the advocates of German legal
science have their way, as is not unlikely, we shall there see a
much greater and more important work accomplished than
that in which Japan is now engaged. Nor does our statement apply to Italy, the home of Roman law, though even
here Austrian law has in part given way to French law; nor
to some portions of what was formerly Turkey in Europe.
But if we look elsewhere, we shall see the Western world
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almost covered by two great streams of legislation, which have
taken their rise largely within the present century,-the one
from a French source, the other from a German. The former
rose earlier and has spread farther; the latter is even yet
acquiring its full force. Many countries had the French Code
imposed upon them by Napoleon, and some of these have
never given up the system then received-Belgium, Baden,
the Rhine provinces, Poland (in Russia), Geneva, and a few
others, Poland has indeed suffered another change of laws
and has come under Russian and Austrian codes. Austria
herself, for nearly a century, has had a code, more or less kin
to the civil law, which prevails in districts having such widely
distinct individualities as Bohemia, Galicia, Dalmatia, and the
Tyrol. Germany for nearly four hundred years has been
slowly putting on the garb of the civil law, until its legal
system now bears the same outward resemblance to the
indigenous Germanic law that the Japanese Houses of Parliament do to the yashiki of Prince Shimadzu. The Goths of
Spain long ago felt the yoke of the Roman law, and for centuries
kept the Roman breviary of Alaric, under another name, until
the Roman law had shaped their whole system. Servia in
1844 enacted a code modelled on the Austrian. Roumania,
in remodelling her laws in 1864, made a code reproducing
exactly the order of the French Code and agreeing with it in
substance. Greece is founding new code-efforts on the French
and Italian models. Scarcely a state in South-America has
not in its code manufacture felt in part the French influencenotably Brazil and Bolivia. In the Orient the dependencies
and protectorates of France, Spain, and Great Britain are daily
mixing the leaven of European law-as yet more or less separate and intact, because personal status almost always determines the law by which each person is governed, but before
long to permeate the lands which its importers govern. There
is, in fact, a world-movement of law, slow and imperceptible, like
that of a glacier, but gradually covering and enfolding all the
countries lying in its path. It is an illustration of the inevitable, the vigorous and coherent prevailing over the weak and
formless. In some instances the indigenous law is entirely
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displaced; in others it is absorbed; in still others it merely
receives scientific form and statement.
We see, then, that the work of Japan is but a drop in the
sea, a foot-path in the midst of highways, a single shot in the
cannonade of centuries. This is not depreciating the importance of the work for Japan itself; for such a task seldom
comes more than once in a nation's lifetime, and for each
nation it has a right to be considered as epoch-making. But
the remembrance that there is in progress a whole worldmovement allows us to look with greater calmness on its
manifestation in any particular quarter and to judge it more
intelligently.
In every country the circumstances leading to the importation of laws have varied somewhat. In every country, too,
the same problem, among others, has come up, with more or
less urgencyi-the adaptation of the new codes to the conditions of the country. And in every case, again, the same
question has had to be met by the advocates of the new laws,
viz.: How far are they in harmony with existing practices?
This, of course, is by no means the whole of the problem.
The new rule may directly contradict the old one, and yet be
decidedly preferable. Or the new rule may fill a gap which
the growing complexities of commerce have left open in the
old. Or there may be a conflict of custom, which will justify
the legislator in stepping in and settling it as he thinks best.
Certainly, where the forms of commerce have changed, or
where moral standards have progressed, the law should
advance also; and this element of the problem is one of the
most important as well as one of the most difficult. But for
a greater or less part of the legal system this question will
still be the decisive one: Do the new laws substantially conflict with the existing rules as understood and upheld by the
people? After eliminating all these considerations of reform,
there will be large portions of the law where the mere fact of
a conflict must be regarded as an argument against the code.
Not that this need determine the fate of such laws or parts of
the code, for other motives may be of higher consequence
than a discrepancy of law and custom. But, at least so far as
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such a consideration goes in the scale, it will then weigh
against the new laws.
The material for the examination of this question has
recently come to hand, in the shape of four volumes, published by the Asiatic Society of Japan, under the editorship of
the writer of this paper. These form Parts I., II., III., and V.
of a series (ultimately to contain eight volumes), entitled
" Materials for the Study of Private Law in Old Japan."
They are partly the records of customary law obtained in
1877-8 by the Government through a commission appointed
in connection with the preparation of the codes; partly a collection of the decisions of the courts of the old r6gime, and
partly a summary of commercial institutions and customs,
made by the editor from the investigations of Japanese
scholars. Of the many topics that suggest themselves for
comparison between the new codes and the old legal notions,
only two or three can here be taken up. The first shall be
Ownership; the second, Sale; the third, Real Suretyship;
and the last, Commercial Paper.
Of the preliminary provisions of Book II., "Property," it is
needless to say that there are no comparisons to make. If
Japanese scholars had been less gentlemen and more men of
the people, if they had not stunted their minds with the dry
nourishment of the Chinese annalists, and had not acquired a
scholarly snobbery which unfitted them for true science, they
would doubtless have created a legal literature, as Europe did.
They would have formulated general legal conceptions and
differentiated rights and obligations. But, as it is, there is not
a law text-book to be found (if we except the tedious commentaries on the antiquated codes of the last millennium,commentaries which rival the Glossaries of the European
Middle ages in long-drawn-out pedantry); and a legal definition is something that is turned up only by the greatest
chance, like a sovereign under a wayside stone. There was
never any scientific, scarcely even any literary, treatment of
the law; and hence we have nothing to compare to the preliminary propositions of the new code. But one thing at least
is worth noticing. Art. 30 of Book II. declares the right of
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property to be a natural right to use, enjoy, and dispose of a
thing within the limits of the law. Now this right of property
may never have been given a definition in Old Japan, but at
least it ezisted. This is worth while insisting upon, for it is an
idea not uncommon among foreigners that Old Japan was a
feudalism in which no rights of the common people were
recognized and respected. This is not true,-no truer than it
was of England under the Tudors. Many an English farmer
in those days saw his corn ruthlessly ruined by the noble
hunters who followed the fox; and, seeing, bore it in impotent
anger. Many a poor wretch writhed under the arbitrary
dealing, miscalled justice, of judges like Jeffreys. Many a
rich Jew saw his. money disappear forever into the hands of
the prince who wanted what he pleasantly chose to call a
loan. Many a man spent years in Newgate dens at the false
suit of some oppressive aristocrat whom he had offended.
But the farmer was none the less an owner of property;
English justice was no less a national fact; and the action of
debt was no less a foundation stone of civil procedure. Whiatever may have been in Japan the chicanery of this or that
daikwan, or the insolence of a drunken samurai,law reigned
and right existed under the Tokugawa Shoguns. The merchant could and did sue the samurai when he pleased,-a
privilege which did not exist in Sweden, for instance, until the
reforms of Struensee in the last century. The feudal lord
could not and did not take away the farmer's land as he
pleased. It is R6musat, if we are not mistaken, who says
that custom is in Oriental countries a greater tyrant than the
so-called despot himself. People forget that in feudal Japan,
as in medieval England, the constitution was set deep in a
strong foundation of custom; and the force of tradition and
opinion was the sufficient sanction of property rights. Take
for proof the statements of the Collection of Customs on this
power of the lord to deprive the farmer of his land. There
was no fief in which the administration was more strict or the
tax burdens more heavy than that of Sendai (Rikuzen kuni).
Yet there we find it recorded: "The owner of realty can do
as he pleases with it, except that he may not sell it in per-
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petuity. His ownership is inviolable, unless it is confiscated
for crime or taken for public purposes," both being recognized processes of English law. Furthermore, "the latter
occurs when the feudal officer needs the land for a special
purpose or when a reservoir or storage for public use has to
be constructed on the land. An order is issued for the taking,
and other land is given by way of recompense; but if there is
no other land that can be so given, the owner of the plot
taken must suffer the loss, and cannot even claim the price."
This right of compensation was thus an incomplete one in
this fief. But it may be worth remembering that even to-day
the constitutions of at least three of the United States permit
the taking of land for public purposes without compensation,
and that this has been done by the Legislature of at least one
State. In Uzen kuni, again, "the person so entered [in the
register] as owner has a perfect title, and may sell, pledge, or
otherwise dispose of the property. His ownership is inviolable, except in case of confiscation for crime by order of the
feudal lord.

.

.

When saltpetre is discovered in a lot of

residence-land, the feudal lord has the exclusive right of
mining it; but compensation will be paid to the owner for
any injury inflicted thereby." In Idzumo kuni, it is related,
" [land] may be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of at
pleasure, provided taxes are not in arrear. No one can under
any circumstances be deprived of his property against his will."
These statements are no less than could be made in any European country. If these extracts were not enough to indicate
the general conception of land proprietorship, the almost universal prevalence of the land-registry system would point
unmistakably to the regularity and security of proprietary
rights, and the constant employment of the terms ]i-nusld
(land-owner) and iye-nushi (house-owner) would indicate the
nature of the popular conception.
We think complacently in some of our Western countries
(unfortunately England is here able to show anything but
complacency) of the advance that has been made in the present
century in the registration of proprietary and hypothecary
titles to realty, especially in Continental Europe. Perhaps it
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would not be safe to say that Japan has preceded all Europe
in the establishment of a registry system; for we do not yet
know whether before the time of Iyeyasu (16oo) the Japanese
registry system was well organized. But certainly there is no
civilized state in which the system has been more thoroughly
in force in all dealings with land for a longer time than in
Japan. In England the Saxon shire-register disappeared
under the Norman r6gime, and the Domesday Book was a
passing effort at publicity which was not persisted in.
Germany, since the early middle ages, had no registry system
(except in a few commercial towns like Hamburg, Lubeck,
and Bremen) until the Prussian hypothecary-registration law
of 1783, and the general registration of land-titles is a matter
of the present century. In France, transfers of ownership
were not registered (since the feudal system of the Middle
Ages) till the Revolution; the spirit of the Roman law having
everywhere been unfavorable to this expedient. There is no
nation among whose people the idea of land-registration has
become so deeply instilled as one of the elements of rights in
land as in Japan. The absence of a registry is simply unthinkable to the ordinary Japanese, and his mind turns to the
registry as the proper accompaniment of all land-transfers, as
naturally as the passenger taking the railway turns first to the
ticket-office. The Japanese student smiles when he hears
that England has no registry system, and it is practically
impossible to get him to consider seriously the many complications arising under Anglo-American law for lack of it. For
him it is a matter of pure speculation, a reasoning about the
unreal.
We come now to Sales. A sale, says Art. 25 of the Code,
is complete upon an agreement being reached by the parties.
For immovables (realty), however, a registration is necessary
at the land registry office. This, as has already been stated,
is quite in harmony with an almost universal custom of Old
Japan. Registration in some form or another seems to have
been usual in all transfers of realty; and even in case of horses
and other personalty the feudal lords frequently required the
recording of transfers. When one considers what a large
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place the transaction of sale occupies among those dealing
with land, one realizes how important the fact of this harmony
of code and custom is in this particular relation. Imagine the
state into which all England would be thrown to-day if a law
of compulsory registration of land sales were imposed, and we
can understand what it means to assert that the new Code is
opposed to the customs of the people, and what it means to
show that, on the contrary, the new Code, in so broad and
radical a feature as this, finds itself in entire accord with the
immemorial habits of the nation. It may be noted here that
while the fees for registration are in America customarily paid
(we believe) by the seller, the Japanese (and the French)
custom has been (according to the Collection of Customs) for
the buyer to undertake these. The Code (Art. 34) leaves it
to the agreement of the parties ; but in the absence of agreement divides the expense equally between them. In America
the registration fee is fixed according to the number of documents; in Old Japan it was a percentage (buichikin) of the
price paid, with various presents and feasts to the officials in
addition. Under the Code the fee is regulated by the assesed
value of the plot transferred. In the West the last method is
impossible; but in this country it is quite feasible, more just,
and far more effective than the practice in Old Japan, which
was always liable (as the Collection of Customs mentions) to
evasion by the parties.
In the articles dealing with earnest-money we find a coinci
dence of custom between Rome and Japan which is not merely
interesting but even startling. Long ago, even before Justinian's codification, the rule of Roman law was that, where
earnest-money (arra) was given, the buyer, on withdrawing,
forfeited the sum; the seller, on refusing to deliver, must
restore double the earnest. This provision came down the
ages and found a place in the Code of Napoleon. It gives
one almost an uncanny feeling, in looking over these, records
of Japanese customs, taken down from the lips of men who
had never heard of Rome or the French Code and had even
(in most instances) never seen a foreigner, to find a dozen
passages indicating that the identical rule of Roman law
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obtained in Old Japan. In Suruga kuni, for instance: "If the
buyer repudiates a contract of sale, he loses the earnestmoney; this they call 'losing the earnest.' If the seller
repudiates, he must pay back double the amount of the
earnest; this they call ' returning double the earnest.' " The
name is sometimes "clinch-money" (sashi-kin), sometimes
"contract-money" (yakujo-kin); but the rule is always the
same. Doubtless we may persuade ourselves that it was
natural enough to hit upon the same expedient even in
communities so widely sundered. But this is not the first
instance we have cited of a peculiar coincidence in ideas between
Japanese and French traditional rules; and we cannot refrain
from calling attention again to the greater facilities which
French law has offered in the task of giving scientific form
to the legal principles established among the Japanese people.
The incidence of the risk of an article sold is, perhaps, one of
the most important questions in the transaction of sale, and of
course depends usually upon where the title to the article is at
the time of loss. For a century the law of England and
America has been that the title passes immediately on striking
the bargain, unless special conditions are imposed. The old
Roman law was that the title could not pass until delivery, a
notion, perhaps, usual in a less advanced state of law, though
the risk passed immediately to the buyer. The French law
has gradually got away from this requirement towards the
Anglo-American position (though in the new German Draft
Code the policy of requiring delivery has prevailed); and by
the Japanese Code (Book II., Art. 331, Book III., Art. 25)

the title ordinarily passes at the time of the bargain and without delivery. Hence follows the rule of the Code (Book II.,
Art. 335) that the article (when specified) is from the time of
the bargain at the risk of the buyer, where no condition has
been imposed and where the seller has not specially undertaken the risk. The question is-How does this accord with
existing Japanese notions? Here, as might be expected, we
find a variation of custom. There are eight passages referring
to the point in the records of customs. In four the risk is
placed on the seller; in three on the buyer; and in one other
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it is determined in a peculiar manner, viz., according to the
point reached on the journey by the vessel bearing the goods.
Where the seller bears the risk, much must be allowed for the
possibility that the parties conceived the sale as conditional,
and therefore not yet consummated (as would often be the case
where earnest-money is given), and thus even under the Code
the risk would be on the seller. What the general belief is
among Japanese vendors and purchasers as to the incidence of
the risk can thus not be clearly ascertained from these records
of customs.
In either case the prevailing custom in some
sections will have to be sacrificed, and the legislators in making their choice of principles have put themselves in line with
the general trend of modern French and English practice.
We fancy that Japan will in this respect, at least, be no worse
off than Germany would be under her new Draft Code, after
rejecting the prevailing rule of buyer's risk and throwing the
risk on the seller.
The chief obligations of the seller, according to the Code,
are (I) to deliver, (2) to guarantee title, and (3) to warrant the
absence of defects; and of the buyer, to pay at the time and
place agreed. In the Collection of Customs we read that "in
sales of personalty the seller must deliver the article, and must
also guarantee its genuineness; the buyer must pay at the
time and place agreed on." As to the first obligation, the
general custom in Japan was, as we might expect, to place it
on the seller, as in the Code. This is the sense of the half
dozen passages touching on the point; though of course the
parties might have agreed to the contrary. The second obligation, the guarantee of title, is not spoken of in the Collection
of Customs. But we know that a covenant against eviction
was long ago used in Japanese deeds of land, and there will be
nothing new in the principle here given legal sanction. The
Collection of Customs, however, mentions several times what
corresponds to the English covenant against disturbance by
the grantor or those claiming under him ; it reads, " neither I
nor my descendants may hereafter raise objection to this
transfer." But this guarantee seems not to be required by
the Code.
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There is a third implied obligation on the seller, dealt with
in the Code (Art. 94) among the causes for rescinding the sale.
This is the warranty of freedom from radical defects. The sale
is avoidable for non-apparent defects, irreparable and unknown
to the buyer, if they affect substantially the usefulness or value
of the article to the buyer. This general idea appears clearly
in the Collection of Customs, though not so accurately defined
as in the Code. In Settsu kuni, "payment may be refused
where the realty or personalty is of a different nature from
that contracted for, or where the quantity is different." (Deficiency of quantity is governed by Arts. 48-53 of the Code.)
In Idzumo kuni, "when an article turns out to be not as contracted for, the buyer may refuse to take it, without forfeiting
his earnest-money." " Not as contracted for" is the rending
of "gan (spurious)-zo (make)." Again, as indicated in the
Code, " where the article is bought, and delivery taken, and
cash paid down at the time, the buyer cannot complain that
the article is not as contracted for, because it is due to his own
short-sightedness." This is the traditional English doctrine of
caveat emptor. Others of the less usual forms of sale found
sanctioned and regulated in the Code are also testified to in
the Collection of Customs. Take, for example, sale by auction.
This is the proceeding prescribed in Art. 104, in case the owners
of an indivisible thing cannot agree upon a division or sale.
Now, in the first place, the auction was one of the commonest
institutions of Old Japan. Under the form of a "secret-ticket
sale" (that is with written bids) it was used in all parts anid
among all classes. Furthermore, it was used, among other
purposes, in the very instance prescribed by the Code, as we
learn in two or three passages. In Kaga kuni, "where a
house or an article made with money contributed by a number
of persons is to be sold, ordinary auction or secret-ticket sale
is employed." In Shinano kuni, "where there is to be a sale
of something which belongs to several persons in common,
secret-ticket auction is employed." In Sagami kuni, "When
. * , forest timber, which is the common property of a village,
is to be sold, the sale is held by auction." Here, then, it is
perfectly clear that the people will find their traditional pro-
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cedure fall in exactly with that prescribed by the Code.
Moreover, the auction sale is stated to have been employed
for disposing of the effects of a bankrupt or of one whose
property had been confiscated for crime; and from this it is
but a slight transition to the auction sale on an execution by
a bailiff, as employed in modern law. The whole idea of using
sale by auction wherever conflicting interests are concerned and
securities are needed for impartiality and fairness, was evidently
familiar in Old Japan.
Another point which must be noticed is the elaborate provisions in the Code (Arts. 84-93) concerning the right of
re-purchase reserved by the seller. These correspond to a
practice little known in Anglo-American communities, but very
common in a state of society like that prevailing in Japan and
surviving even yet in Europe; it finds a recognition in the
French Code, and even in the new Draft German Code under
the heading Wiederkaufsrecht or option of re-purchase. The
Code has given full recognition to this custom. A limit has
been placed, however, upon the time for which this privilege
can continue. In old custom this period was often indefinite
or even perpetual; sometimes it was as short as two years.
The Code fixes it at five years for realty, and two years for
personalty. The confl*ict of custom requires that some uniform
rule should be adopted.
The pledge of realty is something quite uncommon in modern
Europe and America, and the chapter on this subject in the
Code is unique in works of the kind. In Roman law its commonest form was known as andichresis, in which the creditor
took possesion of the land and appropriated the profits in
reduction of interest. In Japan the entire profits were taken
in lieu of interest. The usual transaction was for the creditor
to lease the land back to the debtor as tenant (fikikasaku).
For these pledges the Code declares (Art. I i9)that there shall
be a writing, and that unless registered the transaction shall
not be valid as against third parties. The requirement of a
writing was universal in Old Japan, and that of registration
was also, so far as appears, without exception.
The document constituting the pledge, says Art. 120, "must
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contain, in addition to a precise description of the realty, the
amount of the claim and the interest." Certainly the people
of this country will not be put out of countenance by the newfangled notions, for this, for instance, is what a deed of pledge
customarily contained in Shinano kuni: "A recital that the
description of the plot by area, grade of soil, and name, agrees
with that contained in the land register; a recital that a specified sum of money has been borrowed for a specified term of
years; a stipulation that the property may be redeemed on
the expiration of the term by paying the amount of the debt;
and a stipulation that all taxes and charges shall be paid by the
creditor during the term. If the description of the piece of
land takes up more than one page, it is put on a separate
paper, which is also attested by the village officers and is duly
referred to in the principal instrument." And what terrors
can the Code have for a community accustomed to the following process, which obtained in Echigo kuni for the registration
of hypothecs: "The instrument is countersealed by the
debtor's company and transmitted with a petition to the
ward representative; the latter searches the register to see
whether a prior mortgage exists, enters in the register of the
ward assembly the debtor's name, the amount borrowed, the
term, and the interest, certifies by inscription the genuineness
of the instrument, and hands it to the elder, who examines,
endorses, and seals it ?"
The Code prescribes unconditionally (Art. 125) that the
creditor "shall pay the taxes and other annual imposts."
The Tokugawa rule was equally plain and insistent, and was
directed against all the various forms of evasion of this just
principle. "Any provision that, while the pledgee shall cultivate the land and take the profits, the pledgor shall nevertheless
pay the taxes and render the local services; or that the pledgor
who attorns as tenant of the pledgee shall render the local
services; or that the pledgor shall attorn as tenant of the
pledged land and shall pay and render taxes and services . .
is unlawful." The Code perpetuates (Art. 126) the old rule
that the creditor is (in the absence of special contract) to take
the profits of the property, if it is cultivated or forest land, in
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lieu of interest, thus taking the risk of good or bad crops. In
hypothecs, on the contrary (where the debtor keeps possession),
the creditor of course gets only the interest on his loan. The
Tokugawa Courts enforced this rule strictly, and where, for
some reasons, a pledge of realty proved invalid, they treated it
as a hypothec and reduced the rental due from the tenantdebtor to the rate of legal interest.
(To be continued.)

